WEBINAR RECORDING:
DATE: Thursday, January 26, 2023
TIME: 14:30h CET (1.5 hour)
RECORDING: The talk portion of the webinar is now available above.
WEBINAR SUMMARY:
For decades, many industrial companies have deliberately manipulated and challenged assessments of the environmental safety of chemicals and, in turn, regulatory decisions. Historical examples of this include the tobacco industry, sugar and soft drink industry, oil and atomic energy industry, the medical and the chemical industry, among others.
In the webinar organized by the IPCP on 26 January 2023, hosted by Prof. Martin Scheringer (IPCP Chair) and moderated by Dr. Jane Muncke (Managing Director of the Food Packaging Forum Foundation, Zurich, Switzerland), the issue of conflicts of interest (COI) and corporate manipulation and suppression of scientific evidence was addressed and presented to a wide audience of over 400 participants by five renowned experts who have been working on this issue for many years. The invited speakers included David Azoulay (Director of Environmental Health, Center of International Environmental Law, Switzerland), Prof. Laura Vandenberg (University of Massachusetts, USA), Prof. David Michaels, (George Washington University, USA), Rob Bilott (Attorney, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, USA) and Dr. Marcos Orellana (UN Rapporteur on Toxics and Human Rights and Adjunct Professor, George Washington University, USA). This event was hosted via a webinar platform made available by the Department of Biological and Environmental Sciences at the University of Gothenburg.
Main messages of the five lecturers are described in this summary: the tactics of the chemical industry to manufacture doubt, the impact and consequences of these, in some cases criminal, activities as well as ways to improve the situation.
David Azoulay pointed out that in his experience over the past 15 years, he has seen many examples of corporate influence on regulatory processes and the creation of doubt. As examples, he cited the UNEP and WHO scientific report on endocrine disrupting chemicals (EDCs), which was significantly delayed by scientists hired by industry to sow doubt about the science, e.g. by intentionally overstating the importance of minor methodological flaws and/or outright ignoring findings which resulted in not including a list of EDCs as originally intended. Even after exerting this influence, at the global policy meeting where this report was presented, industry members did not welcome or support it and requested to add a footnote to that effect. As another example, David reported on how industry continues to obstruct the inclusion of asbestos and paraquat in the Rotterdam Convention despite clear consensus by the scientific body of the convention. Other examples include manipulating legal processes for example by supporting regulatory risk assessment and then claiming unacceptable cost increases (up to ten times) and job losses. Industry sometimes even resorts to criminal activity, as in the case of asbestos, where the industry tried to influence the decision of the authorities through a film-maker who had been commissioned by the WHO in India to film the fate of asbestos victims. The film-maker used this assignment to infiltrate on-the ground movements, covertly reporting strategies and developments back to the industry. Only in the aftermath was it revealed that the film-maker was paid by the industry. Examples clearly show that industry lobbying can skew regulatory processes towards less stringent restrictions. Transparent declaration of conflicts of interest by members of decision-making bodies is of course essential, but further measures are needed. One poignant example is the exclusion of tobacco industry representatives from the strategic deliberations of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control.
Laura Vandenberg, a researcher on the environmental impact of EDCs, spoke of “manufactured doubt“, i.e. actions that deliberately alter and misinterpret scientific facts and empirical findings, often to the benefit of industry, a particular company or a group of individuals. Tactics to achieve this goal are many and varied, such as directly attacking a study design, enlisting the support of respected scientists, misrepresenting or suppressing incriminating information (think of EXXON Mobil’s management withholding decades-old warnings about climate change from EXXON scientists), using exaggerated language (using buzzwords such as sound science and junk science), contributing misleading literature, organizing conferences, exploiting scientific illiteracy, obstructing and influencing government regulation, attacking opponents, altering products to make them appear healthier. Prof. Vandenberg concludes her presentation by recommending that conflict of interest declarations alone are not enough, and that experts with commercial ties must be prevented from having undue proximity to regulatory bodies and definitely excluded from committees with decision-making power regarding environmental risk assessment.
For Prof. David Michaels, author of the well-received books “The Triumph of Doubt” and “Doubt is Their Product“, the rise of corporate manipulation of scientific data is now a widely observed procedure to create and disseminate disinformation by manufacturing scientific uncertainty about the harms of their products or activities. He recounts the case of the toxicological findings, including cancer, of perfluorooctanoic acid (PFOA) that were challenged by industry-hired experts, and the subsequent lobbying of the US National Toxicology Program by said “experts” to downgrade the hazard classification of PFOA. The PFOA manufacturer hired a product defense consultant to produce a strategic literature review which concluded that the epidemiological evidence did not support a causal relationship between PFOA and cancer in humans. The same company decided much later to cease production of poly- and perfluorinated chemicals, apparently because of the overwhelming evidence of such causal links. An overarching problem is that industry-funded experts defending their products undermine the credibility of all scientists. Prof. Michaels concluded that to ensure unbiased decision-making, conflicted scientists should be excluded from efforts to synthesize scientific evidence and develop public health and environmental policy.
Rob Bilott, author of the acclaimed book “Exposure” (which has also been made into the award-winning film “Dark Waters”) and a practicing lawyer specializing in the chemical class of PFAS, summarized from his many years of experience the sophisticated system used by industry to control information about the environmental safety of chemicals, i.e. what is published, what data is reported in scientific journals, who peer-reviews the manuscripts and how the literature is deliberately used to give decision-makers the impression that the chemicals are safe. Rob made it clear that industry scientists should not be involved in the drafting of chemical risk assessment documents, which has often happened, for example through direct meetings between industry scientists and regulators: data presented at such meetings are signed off and thus become ‘government data’. The only way to prevent this manipulation, and the often-heard arguments from companies that the data is incomplete, not yet clear enough and uncertain, is to have absolute transparency throughout the assessment process. One way forward is to set up an independent scientific panel, with members appointed by the courts, to investigate a possible causal link between a particular chemical or class of chemicals and a disease. The panel would have to review all the available information (published or unpublished internal studies) in a fully transparent manner, organized by a court-appointed neutral administrator, and there would be no ex parte communications with company representatives. The conclusions of the panel meetings could be presented first to the public through court filings before being subject to potential censorship or filtering by traditional journal-controlled peer-reviewed processes.
Marcos Orellana, author of the report “Right to science in the context of toxic substances” for the United Nations Human Rights Council, explains that the right to science requires that policies on toxic substances be based on the best available scientific evidence, but in reality, there is a gap between scientific knowledge and regulatory responses. This gap is the result of disinformation (science for hire), lack of participation of civil society in the design of environmental policy, and the undermining of the science-policy interface by conflicts of interest. As an example at the national level, he reported that in Paraguay, the government changed the composition of the body that decides on funding for research projects to include industry representatives after academic scientists published papers on genetic damage in children exposed to pesticides, thus creating a clear conflict of interest. Another case was the illegal transport and dumping of large quantities of hazardous waste from Sweden to northern Chile. The victims of this public health disaster, living near the dump site, took their case to the Swedish courts against a Swedish metal production company that arranged the dumping in Chile. The company’s mercenary scientists were able to cast doubt on causation, and the court ruled that the health effects were not caused by exposure to the toxic waste. On a global scale, chemicals and waste are exceeding the safe space for humanity, the planetary boundary. While the UN Environmental Assembly was designed to strengthen the environmental dimension of sustainable development, its approach to stakeholder engagement has bundled civil society, scientists and corporate interests. This has undermined the ability of civil society to speak in one voice, as much as it has confounded the specific views of scientists.
During the general discussion corporate delay tactics and lack of transparency were named as the main problems. As steps forward, the following suggestions were formulated:
- A system change is needed and requires addressing the lack of awareness by incorporating awareness about COI into lectures and in textbook chapters. The media has also a role to play in educating and alerting the public about specific cases of COI.
- Participation of scientists from academic institutions in the UNEA negotiations and preparation of the science policy panel is currently not possible (other than via other accredited organizations) because academic institutions are not accredited as non-governmental entities: this has to be changed.
- A tax on a small number of basic chemicals used for the synthesis of commercial chemicals and products would generate huge revenues that could be dedicated towards addressing chemical-related environmental problems. These revenues could go into a fund for research on chemicals that would need to be shielded from industry influence; there is a CIEL report on this: https://www.ciel.org/reports/chemicalstax/.
- The vast amount of data in industrial and governmental archives on the environmental fate of chemicals and products (persistence, long-range transport, (eco)toxicity) should be made available for academic research.
- Challenges faced by low- and middle-income countries can’t be underestimated.
- It’s time to change the presumption of innocence [of chemicals] and to rethink intellectual property rights as a barrier to meaningful public access to information.
- Conflation of “conflicts of interest” with “interests” in general serves to muddy the waters about how to manage conflicts of interest; see Bero LA, Grundy Q. (2016) Why having a (nonfinancial) interest is not a conflict of interest. PLoS Biol 14. https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.2001221.
Many comments and questions were submitted to the organizers by the numerous webinar participants, such as the *role of “private public partnerships” facilitating the corporate capture of international fora, *necessary steps to transition from the knowledge on COI to actionable measures in the ongoing negotiations on the new science policy panel and the role of regulatory agencies in this process, *lack of points of entry of scientists from low- and middle-income countries into this process, *industrial sponsoring of conferences. Such and further questions could not be touched in this webinar due to time limitation. In response to the great interest of participants and the breadth of the topic, the IPCP Board intends to organize a follow-up event still in 2023.
Relevant resources:
Bilott R. (2020) Exposure: Poisoned water, corporate greed, and one lawyer’s twenty-year battle against DuPont. https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/Exposure/Robert-Bilott/9781501172823
Goldberg RF and Vandenberg LN. (2021) The science of spin: Targeted strategies to manufacture doubt with detrimental effects on environmental and public health. Environ Health 20, 33. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12940-021-00723-0
Goldberg RF and Vandenberg LN. (2019) Distract, delay, disrupt: Examples of manufactured doubt from five industries. Reviews on Environmental Health 34, 4. https://doi.org/10.1515/reveh-2019-0004
Michaels D. (2020) The triumph of doubt: Dark money and the science of deception. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/the-triumph-of-doubt-9780190922665?cc=us&lang=en&
Michaels D. (2008) Doubt is their product: How industry’s assault on science threatens your health. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/doubt-is-their-product-9780195300673?cc=us&lang=en&
Orellana M. (2021) Rights and author of right to science in the context of toxic substances: Report of the Special Rapporteur on the implications for human rights of the environmentally sound management and disposal of hazardous substances and wastes. https://undocs.org/Home/Mobile?FinalSymbol=A%2FHRC%2F48%2F61&Language=E&DeviceType=Desktop&LangRequested=False
Additional resources:
Ågerstrand M, Backhaus T, Barra R, Diamond M, Grimalt J, Groh K, Kandie F, Kurt-Karakus P, Letcher R, Lohmann R, Meire R, Oluseyi T, Schäffer A, Septiono M, Sigmund G, Soehl A, Sogbanmu T, Suzuki N, Venier M, Vlahos P, Scheringer M. (2023) Key principles for the intergovernmental science–policy panel on chemicals and waste. Environmental Science & Technology. https://pubs.acs.org/doi/10.1021/acs.est.2c08283
Bero LA, Grundy Q. (2016) Why having a (nonfinancial) interest is not a conflict of interest. PLoS Biol 14. https://journals.plos.org/plosbiology/article?id=10.1371/journal.pbio.2001221
Campbell B. (2022) Corporate rules: The real world of business regulation in Canada. How government regulators are failing the public interest. https://lorimer.ca/adults/product/corporate-rules-the-real-world-of-business-regulation-in-canada/
ChemSec. (2015) Cry wolf: Companies and trade organizations frequently tell politicians that stricter environmental legislation would harm the economy significantly – but such claims have repeatedly been proven wrong. https://chemsec.org/publication/chemicals-business/cry-wolf-2015/
CIEL. (2020) Financing the sound management of chemicals beyond 2020: Options for a coordinated tax. https://www.ciel.org/reports/chemicalstax/
EEA. (2001) Late lessons from early warnings: The precautionary principle 1896–2000. https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental_issue_report_2001_22/at_download/file
EEA. (2013) Late lessons from early warnings: Science, precaution, innovation. https://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/late-lessons-2
IISD. (2021) Special Rapporteur highlights right to science, impact of plastics on human rights. https://sdg.iisd.org/news/special-rapporteur-highlights-right-to-science-impact-of-plastics-on-human-rights/
Kassotis CD, Vandenberg LN, Demeneix BA, Porta M, Slama R, Trasande L. (2020) Endocrine-disrupting chemicals: economic, regulatory, and policy implications. Lancet Diabetes Endocrinol 8,8. https://doi.org/10.1016/s2213-8587(20)30128-5
Wang Z, Altenburger R, Backhaus T, Covaci A, Diamond ML, Grimalt JO, Lohmann R, Schäffer A, Scheringer M, Selin H, Soehl A, Suzuki N. (2021) We need a global science-policy body on chemicals and waste. Science 371(6531). Free access: https://www.ipcp.ch/activities/developing-a-global-science-policy-body-for-chemical-pollution
Wang Z, Summerson I, Lai A, Boucher JM, Scheringer M. (2019) Strengthening the science-policy interface in international chemicals governance: A mapping and gap analysis. https://zenodo.org/record/2559189